ultra mega supermarket quezon city Round-the-clock aerial surveillance, drug detection fuel beefed-up border plan

Stock market today: Nvidia drags Wall Street from its records as oil and gold riseBeing the national currency of the Philippines the value and fluctuations of the currency depend on many economic and political situations. This is a great knowledge for forex traders interested in the peso’s fluctuations and how to use them for their benefit. Thai Baht for example has little step in forex market except for emerging markets trade which involves Philippine peso. The Philippine Peso is among the most convertible currencies in Southeast Asia and widely quoted with reference to US Dollar (USD), Euro (EUR) and Japanese Yen (JPY). Although not as liquid as major global currencies, its value can move big time due to the Philippines’ economic links with regional and global markets. For traders, that’s a good thing. Its volatility can be a short-term profit opportunity and its link to the country’s growing economy is a long-term attraction. The Philippine Peso is influenced by a mix of local and global factors. From economic policies to global trends, these are the elements that shape the peso’s performance in the forex market. Knowing these can help traders anticipate and make better decisions. Overseas Workers (OFWs) are the backbone of the economy, sending billions of dollars back home every year. These remittances generate a regular consumption which increases especially during occasions such as the christmas season and the opening of classes. According to the research, BSP is one of the tools that, if well managed, can help in stabilizing peso. Interest rates, rate of inflation and monetary policies have influences over the position of the currency in the forex market. The Philippine balances of trade is negative ; the country exports lesser than what it imports. This has resulted into a less supply for pesos specifically because more of the foreign currency is required in the payment of imports. They hold that election or any political event can lead to political risk and hence high volatility for the peso. These changes are eyed by forex traders because they can cause a great deal of movement in the currencies. Philippine Peso has been found to generally move along with other currencies of the Southeast Asia region. The peso and its counterparts tend to decline during global shocks or when a particular region plunges. That is why the peso is a perfect marker for a forex trader interested in the Southeast Asian region. The Philippine Peso has its own opportunities for forex traders especially those who know its patterns and market drivers. Whether seasonal, economic or regional, these opportunities allow traders to ride the peso’s movements and diversify their trades. The peso is sensitive to economic and political changes so there’s profit potential in the short term. It moves a lot so if you understand how it behaves you can trade it. Trading the peso with other ASEAN currencies can diversify your portfolio. It moves with regional events so it’s broader opportunities. Trading the Philippine Peso can be profitable but it has its risks . Market volatility, limited liquidity and external pressures can be a challenge for traders. Knowing these risks is key to developing a strategy to minimize losses while navigating the forex market. Compared to major currencies like USD or EUR, the peso is less liquid. This means wider spreads so trading costs higher for you. The peso widely relies on the US dollar and foreign exchange. It means it can have access to external shocks such as increase in oil prices or fluctuation in the American monetary policies. Follow remittance reports, inflation rates and policy of the BSP. They can be your reference to the direction of the peso in the forex market. Peso has trends so chart analysis is going to be effective. This you can use to establish your entry and exit points. There other factors which could impact peso for instance, the US interest rate or oil prices. Commodities trading explained for forex in the Philippines highlights how fluctuations in commodity prices, such as crude oil or agricultural exports, can impact the peso’s strength against major currencies. Knowing when you are in a bear market assists you in being prepared, make the necessary change and work towards a solution . While often considered a purely domestic currency, the Philippine peso is a dynamic actor in the forex space, affected by and affecting the flow of currencies elicited by remittances, trade balance and regional trends. In fact, there are significant benefits for traders who successfully identify what influences the peso as well as reduce possible risks. Through tracking the economic signals and occurrences in certain realm, forex traders can capitalize in the peso for short term or long term.New Delhi: The outlook for gold presents a mix of challenges and opportunities, with the precious metal poised for modest growth amid a dynamic global economic landscape in 2025, according to World Gold Council . Market projections suggest gold may experience steady, albeit modest, growth in 2025. Key economic variables like global GDP, bond yields, and inflation indicate a stable environment, though risks remain. Several factors, including central bank actions, geopolitical tensions, and evolving consumer and investor demand, will shape gold's performance. Potential upside could emerge from stronger-than-expected central bank purchases or economic shocks prompting a flight to safe assets. On the flip side, tighter monetary policies and rising interest rates could weigh on gold. The United States, under President Trump's second term, is a critical factor in gold's trajectory. While a pro-business agenda may boost domestic sentiment, global investors are cautious, wary of inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions. 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View Program Entrepreneurship Crafting a Powerful Startup Value Proposition By - Dr. Anu Khanchandani, Startup Coach with more than 25 years of experience View Program Web Development Advanced C++ Mastery: OOPs and Template Techniques By - Metla Sudha Sekhar, IT Specialist and Developer View Program Artificial Intelligence(AI) Collaborative AI Foundations: Working Smarter with Machines By - Prince Patni, Software Developer (BI, Data Science) View Program Web Development Advanced Java Mastery: Object-Oriented Programming Techniques By - Metla Sudha Sekhar, IT Specialist and Developer View Program Web Development Java 21 Essentials for Beginners: Build Strong Programming Foundations By - Metla Sudha Sekhar, IT Specialist and Developer View Program Entrepreneurship Building Your Winning Startup Team: Key Strategies for Success By - Dr. Anu Khanchandani, Startup Coach with more than 25 years of experience View Program Artificial Intelligence(AI) AI and Analytics based Business Strategy By - Tanusree De, Managing Director- Accenture Technology Lead, Trustworthy AI Center of Excellence: ATCI View Program Entrepreneurship Startup Fundraising: Essential Tactics for Securing Capital By - Dr. Anu Khanchandani, Startup Coach with more than 25 years of experience View Program Legal Complete Guide to AI Governance and Compliance By - Prince Patni, Software Developer (BI, Data Science) View Program Office Productivity Advanced Excel Course - Financial Calculations & Excel Made Easy By - Anirudh Saraf, Founder- Saraf A & Associates, Chartered Accountant View Program Data Science MySQL for Beginners: Learn Data Science and Analytics Skills By - Metla Sudha Sekhar, IT Specialist and Developer View Program Finance A2Z Of Money By - elearnmarkets, Financial Education by StockEdge View Program Artificial Intelligence(AI) AI for Everyone: Understanding and Applying the Basics on Artificial Intelligence By - Ritesh Vajariya, Generative AI Expert View Program Entrepreneurship Validating Your Startup Idea: Steps to Ensure Market Fit By - Dr. Anu Khanchandani, Startup Coach with more than 25 years of experience View Program Office Productivity Microsoft Word Mastery: From Beginner to Expert By - CA Raj K Agrawal, Chartered Accountant View Program Artificial Intelligence(AI) ChatGPT Mastery from Zero to Hero: The Complete AI Course By - Metla Sudha Sekhar, IT Specialist and Developer View Program Strategy ESG and Business Sustainability Strategy By - Vipul Arora, Partner, ESG & Climate Solutions at Sattva Consulting Author I Speaker I Thought Leader View Program Design Canva Magic Write: Ideas to Stunning Slides in No Time By - Prince Patni, Software Developer (BI, Data Science) View Program Entrepreneurship Boosting Startup Revenue with 6 AI-Powered Sales Automation Techniques By - Dr. Anu Khanchandani, Startup Coach with more than 25 years of experience View Program Web Development Maximizing Developer Productivity: The Pomodoro Technique in Practice By - Prince Patni, Software Developer (BI, Data Science) View Program The Federal Reserve is expected to cut interest rates by 100 basis points by the year end, which historically supports gold, but a prolonged pause or reversal in policy could pose challenges. China and India, the two largest gold markets, will remain vital to gold's performance. In China, economic growth and government stimulus could influence consumer demand, though competition from stocks and real estate may limit gold's appeal. India is in a stronger position, with economic growth above 6.5 per cent supporting consumer demand. Additionally, financial gold investment products are gaining popularity in India, adding resilience to the market. Central banks have been net buyers of gold for nearly 15 years, recognizing its value as a crisis hedge and a reliable reserve asset. In 2025, central bank demand is projected to exceed the long-term average of 500 tonnes, continuing to bolster gold prices. However, a dip below this level could introduce headwinds for the metal. Uncertainty remains a significant factor. Geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions like South Korea and Syria, and concerns over European sovereign debt could drive risk-averse investors toward gold. At the same time, the interplay between gold's key drivers--economic expansion, risk perception, opportunity cost, and momentum--will influence its price. Gold is expected to trade within a range similar to late 2024, reflecting the market's pricing of available information. Lower interest rates or heightened geopolitical risks could push prices higher, while a combination of rising rates and slowing growth may apply downward pressure. Central bank buying will remain crucial, providing a steady foundation for gold in 2025. Nominations for ET MSME Awards are now open. The last day to apply is December 15, 2024. Click here to submit your entry for any one or more of the 22 categories and stand a chance to win a prestigious award. (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel )

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OTTAWA — The RCMP will create a new aerial intelligence task force to provide round-the-clock surveillance of Canada’s border using helicopters, drones and surveillance towers. The move is part of the federal government’s $1.3-billion upgrade to border security and monitoring to appease concerns of U.S. president-elect Donald Trump about the flow of migrants and illegal drugs. Trump has threatened to impose a 25 per cent tariff on all Canadian and Mexican exports to the U.S. as soon as he is inaugurated next month unless both countries move to improve border security. Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc says he has discussed parts of the plan with American officials and that he is optimistic about its reception. Canada will also propose to the United States to create a North American “joint strike force” to target organized crime groups that work across borders. The government also intends to provide new technology, tools and resources to the Canada Border Services Agency to seek out fentanyl using chemical detection, artificial intelligence and canine teams. This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 17, 2024. Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press

( MENAFN - GlobeNewsWire - Nasdaq) HONESDALE, Pa., Dec. 17, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Norwood financial Corp (NASDAQ: NWFL) (“Norwood” or the“Company”) today announced the pricing of a public offering of 1,000,000 shares of its common stock, $0.10 par value (the“Common Stock”), at a public offering price of $26.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of approximately $26 million. In addition, the Company has granted the underwriters a 30-day option to purchase up to an additional 150,000 shares of common stock (the“over-allotment option”) at the public offering price, less underwriting discounts. If the over-allotment option is exercised in full by the underwriters, the aggregate gross proceeds to the Company would be approximately $30 million. The Company expects to close the offering, subject to customary conditions, on or about December 19, 2024. Norwood expects to use the net proceeds from this offering for investment into its bank subsidiary to support its capital ratios in connection with the repositioning of a substantial portion of the Company's available-for-sale debt securities portfolio, and for general corporate purposes, repurchase of our common stock and support acquisitions of other institutions or branches if opportunities for such transactions become available. Piper Sandler & Co. acted as lead book-running manager for the offering, and Janney Montgomery Scott LLC acted as joint book-running manager for the offering. The Common Stock will be issued pursuant to an effective shelf registration statement (File No. 333-279619) (including base prospectus) and a preliminary prospectus supplement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the“SEC”), and a final prospectus supplement to be filed with the SEC. Prospective investors should read the preliminary prospectus supplement and accompanying base prospectus in the registration statement and other documents the Company has filed or will file with the SEC for more complete information about the Company and the offering. Copies of the preliminary prospectus supplement and the accompanying base prospectus relating to the Common Stock offering can be obtained without charge by visiting the SEC's website at , or by emailing Piper Sandler & Co. at ... or by emailing Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, at .... This press release is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, nor shall there be any sale of the securities in any state or other jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. Any offering of the Common Stock is being made only by means of a written prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The securities being offered have not been approved or disapproved by any regulatory authority, nor has any such authority passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the prospectus supplement or the shelf registration statement or prospectus relating thereto. The securities being offered are not savings accounts, deposits or other obligations of any bank or non-bank subsidiary of Norwood and are not insured or guaranteed by the FDIC or any other governmental agency. ABOUT NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP Norwood Financial Corp is the parent company of Wayne Bank, which operates from fourteen offices throughout Northeastern Pennsylvania and fifteen offices in Delaware, Sullivan, Ontario, Otsego and Yates Counties, New York. The Company's stock trades on the Nasdaq Global Market under the symbol“NWFL”. FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS This press release contains a number of forward-looking statements within the meaning and protections of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Forward-looking statements include statements with respect to our beliefs, plans, objectives, goals, expectations, anticipations, assumptions, estimates, intentions, and future performance, and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which may be beyond our control, and which may cause our actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. All statements other than statements of historical fact are statements that could be forward-looking statements. These statements may be identified by the use of words such as“may”,“will”,“anticipate”,“assume”,“should”,“indicate”,“would”,“believe”,“contemplate”,“expect”,“estimate”,“continue”,“plan”,“point to”,“project”,“could”,“intend”,“target”, and other similar words and expressions of the future. These forward-looking statements may not be realized due to a variety of factors, including, general economic conditions, either nationally or in our market areas, that are worse than expected; business or economic disruption from a national or global epidemic or pandemic events; changes in the level and direction of loan delinquencies and write-offs and changes in estimates of the adequacy of the allowance for loan losses; our ability to access cost-effective funding; fluctuations in real estate values and both residential and commercial real estate market conditions; demand for loans and deposits in our market area; our ability to implement changes in our business strategies; the effects of competition from other commercial banks, thrifts, mortgage banking firms, consumer finance companies, credit unions, securities brokerage firms, insurance companies, money market and other mutual funds and other financial institutions operating in our market area and elsewhere, including institutions operating locally, regionally, nationally and internationally, together with such competitors offering banking products and services by mail, telephone, computer and the internet; inflation and changes in the interest rate environment that reduce our margins and yields, or reduce the fair value of financial instruments or reduce the origination levels in our lending business, or increase the level of defaults, losses and prepayments on loans we have made and make whether held in portfolio or sold in the secondary markets; adverse changes in the securities markets; changes in laws or government regulations or policies affecting financial institutions, including changes in regulatory fees and capital requirements; changes in monetary or fiscal policies of the U.S. Government, including policies of the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board; the effect of changes in accounting policies and practices, as may be adopted by the regulatory agencies, as well as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Financial Accounting Standards Board, the SEC, and other accounting and reporting standard setters; our ability to manage market risk, credit risk and operational risk in the current economic conditions; our ability to enter new markets successfully and capitalize on growth opportunities; our ability to successfully expand our franchise, including acquisitions or establishing new offices at favorable prices; our ability to successfully integrate any assets, liabilities, customers, systems and management personnel we have acquired or may acquire into our operations and our ability to realize related revenue synergies and cost savings within expected time frames and any goodwill charges related thereto; an increase in the Pennsylvania Bank Shares Tax to which our bank subsidiary's capital stock is currently subject, or imposition of any additional taxes on the capital stock of us or our bank subsidiary; changes in consumer demand, borrowing and savings habits; the ability of third-party providers to perform their obligations to us; the ability of the U.S. Government to manage federal debt limits; cyber-attacks, computer viruses and other technological risks that may breach the security of our websites or other systems to obtain unauthorized access to confidential information and destroy data or disable our systems; technological changes that may be more difficult or expensive than expected; changes in the financial condition, results of operations or future prospects of issuers of securities that we own; other economic, competitive, governmental, regulatory and operational factors affecting our operations, pricing products and services; volatility in the securities markets; disruptions due to flooding, severe weather, or other natural disasters or Acts of God; and acts of war, terrorism, or global military conflict. If one or more of the factors affecting our forward-looking information and statements proves incorrect, then our actual results, performance or achievements could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release. Therefore, we caution you not to place undue reliance on our forward-looking information and statements. Any forward-looking statements are based upon management's beliefs and assumptions at the time they are made. We undertake no obligation to publicly update forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. You are advised, however, to consult any further disclosures we make on related subjects in our periodic and current reports that we file with the SEC. Also note that we provide a cautionary discussion of risks, uncertainties and possibly inaccurate assumptions relevant to our businesses in our periodic and current reports to the SEC. These are factors that, individually or in the aggregate, management believes could cause our actual results to differ materially from expected and historical results. Norwood Financial Corp Contact: John M. McCaffery Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer 272-304-3003 MENAFN17122024004107003653ID1109004849 Legal Disclaimer: MENAFN provides the information “as is” without warranty of any kind. We do not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information contained in this article. If you have any complaints or copyright issues related to this article, kindly contact the provider above.College GameDay Fans Not Happy With Saturday's Guest Pickers

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SACRAMENTO, Calif. — California, home to some of the largest technology companies in the world, would be the first U.S. state to require mental health warning labels on social media sites if lawmakers pass a bill introduced Monday. The legislation sponsored by state Attorney General Rob Bonta is necessary to bolster safety for children online, supporters say, but industry officials vow to fight the measure and others like it under the First Amendment. Warning labels for social media gained swift bipartisan support from dozens of attorneys general, including Bonta, after U.S. Surgeon General Vivek Murthy called on Congress to establish the requirements earlier this year, saying social media is a contributing factor in the mental health crisis among young people. Javascript is required for you to be able to read premium content. Please enable it in your browser settings.

Early in the morning they grabbed what they could – bags with clothes, blankets, and mattresses – and headed south. Families who had been forced to flee because of the war did not wait to see if the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah would hold. Just hours after it came into effect they were driving back home on the main road from Beirut. Some waved the yellow and green flag of Hezbollah, others carried posters with images of the group’s former leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed in an Israeli air strike two months ago. For many this was a moment of celebration. “What happened is very good. This is a victory for the resistance,” said Abu Ali, referring to the ceasefire that had been brokered by the US and France. “May God have mercy on our martyrs. The resistance is a source of honour and pride for us. Without its existence, there would be no homeland, no south, nothing.” His plan was to return to the village Houla, right next to the border. But Israeli troops were still there, he said. “We don’t know whether our house is still standing or has been destroyed,” Ali said. “But we’ll go there.” The 60-day ceasefire will see the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli military, and of Hezbollah fighters and weapons, from Lebanon’s south. The Lebanese army said it was already strengthening its presence there, as part of the deployment of an additional 5,000 soldiers under the deal. Both Israel and Hezbollah have said they are ready to respond to any violations. The ceasefire is the main hope to bring an end to over a year of conflict, that intensified in September with widespread Israeli air strikes, assassinations of top Hezbollah officials and a ground invasion. Israel’s stated goal was to move the group away from the border and stop the attacks on its northern communities. In Lebanon, more than one million people were displaced, mostly from Shia Muslim areas in the south, the eastern Bekka Valley and Dahieh in Beirut – which are essentially controlled by Hezbollah, the powerful militia and political party supported by Iran. They started to return despite warnings from Israeli and Lebanese authorities that it was not yet safe to do so. “It doesn’t matter if the house is still intact or not, the important thing is that we are returning, thanks to the blood of our martyr, Nasrallah,” said Fatma Balhas, who was travelling to the town of Seddiqine. Hezbollah-allied media also said this was a sign the group had been victorious in the war. Near Sidon, the first big city on the coast south of Beirut, cars drove on the opposite carriageway, as a traffic jam formed just outside a military checkpoint. Soldiers handed out leaflets telling people to not touch unexploded ordnance. “Don’t get close, don’t touch it, report it immediately”. As night fell on Wednesday the truce appeared to be holding, with UN chief Antonio Guterres describing it as the “first ray of hope for peace amid the darkness of the past months”. The war has devastated this country, and recovery will be long and difficult. And what will happen with Hezbollah is not clear. The group has been diminished, but it still enjoys significant support. For Lebanon, it means this crisis is not over.Chargers are expected to be without top RB Dobbins and could lean on QB Herbert against Falcons

OTTAWA — The RCMP will create a new aerial intelligence task force to provide round-the-clock surveillance of Canada’s border using helicopters, drones and surveillance towers. The move is part of the federal government’s $1.3-billion upgrade to border security and monitoring to appease concerns of U.S. president-elect Donald Trump about the flow of migrants and illegal drugs. Trump has threatened to impose a 25 per cent tariff on all Canadian and Mexican exports to the U.S. as soon as he is inaugurated next month unless both countries move to improve border security. Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc says he has discussed parts of the plan with American officials and that he is optimistic about its reception. Canada will also propose to the United States to create a North American “joint strike force” to target organized crime groups that work across borders. The government also intends to provide new technology, tools and resources to the Canada Border Services Agency to seek out fentanyl using chemical detection, artificial intelligence and canine teams. This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 17, 2024. Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press

The images of China’s brand new warplanes, which appeared online this week, is a bold “invitation” to an arms race for a next-generation fighter, Dmitry Stefanovich, a military researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has told RT. The videos and photos posted to social media on December 26 show two previously unseen tailles jets – a larger diamond-shaped aircraft, and a smaller plane with an arrow-wing-shaped airframe. While Beijing stays silent on the matter, the display sparked discussion in international media, with some observers suggesting the aircraft could be the first sixth-generation fighter planes. “So far, we have only seen two variants of experimental aircraft,” Stefanovich said. “Presumably, one of them can be tailored for strike missions that involve attacks on ground and, perhaps, naval targets, while another one is tasked with dominating the skies and controlling the airspace.” The footage “demonstrates the general state of the development” of Chinese aircraft rather than sixth-generation planes specifically, the expert argued, noting that ‘sixth generation’ is a “loosely applied term.” Therefore, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the capabilities of the new planes, he said. Beijing will have to compete with American next-generation fighter programs, Stefanovich said. “While there are no game-changers on the horizon, China is explicitly inviting to participate in an arms race, at least in terms of quality,” he said. “We should not forget, however, that the US is the only country with an advanced-stage program for a new strategic bomber – the B-21 – which can be adapted for some of what we would call sixth-generation capabilities. The Chinese and Russian planes of comparable type have not taken off the ground yet,” Stefanovich said.After the apparent benefits to Israel of Syria’s government collapse, the best time to ensure “escalation dominance” and a non-nuclear Iran will still be while its recalcitrant enemy in Tehran is still pre-nuclear. Though Israel’s capacity for missile defense against Iran has already been demonstrated by Jerusalem, even the best active defenses could never offer Israel a reliably long-term survival substitute for apt strategies of offense. Finally because Iran maintains close security ties with an already-nuclear North Korea, Israel will have to consider that non-Islamist adversary in its “post-Syria” calculations and calibrations. Of related importance, Israel will need to determine how the fall of Russia’s surrogate in Damascus will impact Moscow’s continued support of Tehran. After the Syrian collapse, Israel’s nuclear strategy will remain relevant to Iranian non-nuclear threats. Determining variously precise levels of strategic relevance, however, would be difficult in periods of active warfare. During such bewildering periods, Israeli determinations would depend significantly on “soft” explanatory factors such as Iranian leadership rationality and the anticipated destructiveness of Iran-inflicted non-nuclear harms. Moreover, this critical dependence would apply to Iranian first-strike attacks, retaliatory attacks and counter-retaliatory attacks. Variously intersecting issues will need to be considered in Jerusalem. It would be capricious to argue that Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture should necessarily parallel prospective Iranian destructiveness (closely or partially) or that Iranian non-nuclear threats (whether singly by Iran, Iran-based interstate alliances (including North Korea) or Iran-terror-group “hybrids” should be symmetrically countered. Only one thing is certain: appearances will be unreliable predictors. At first glance, a “symmetry hypothesis” could seem to make perfect sense. But strategic truth is excruciatingly complex and could quickly or incrementally prove indecipherable. Because virtually all Israel-related nuclear scenarios would be (i.e., without determinable precedent), nothing of any scientific value could be extrapolated. Concerning Israeli nuclear decision-makers’ usable probabilities, all they could reasonably be asked to accept would be competing iterations of subjective belief. Israel’s core strategies will still need to be informed by refined philosophies of science. In this primary obligation, meaningful assessments of hypotheses concerning “asymmetrical nuclear deterrence” and Israeli national security will need to be founded on formal deductive examinations This unchallengeable imperative indicates that Israeli intelligence assessments devoid of verifiable empirical content could still be usefully predictive. Even in the midst of future war with Iran, these assessments should be supportable by immutably basic standards of logic-based assessment: internal consistency, thematic interconnectedness and dialectical reasoning. A good place for Israeli strategists to accelerate time-urgent investigations would be within the “grey area” of Iranian non-nuclear threats that are unconventional. Most obvious would be credible enemy threats of biological warfare, biological terrorism and/or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. While non-nuclear by definition, biological warfare attacks could produce grievously injurious or near-existential event outcomes for Israel. Apart from science-based expectations of significant human harms, biological warfare attacks would likely have material impact on public fears and national decisions. Similar impacts could be expected from different scenarios involving EMP ordnance. Israeli policies of calibrated nuclear reprisal for biological warfare (BW) attacks could exhibit compelling deterrent effectiveness against certain limited types of adversary. Such policies would be inapplicable against any threats issuing from terror groups that function alone, i.e., without recognizable state alignments. In such residual cases, Israel, lacking any operational targets more suitable for nuclear targeting, would need to “fall back” on the more usual arsenals of counter-terrorist methods. In the future, such a tactical retrogression would be required even if the particular terror group involved had revealed believable nuclear threat capabilities. Because such terrorists could identify personal death as a sanctifying expression of religious martyrdom Israeli planners might have to draw upon continuously mutating psychological assessments. What about Iranian conventional threats that would involve neither nuclear nor biological hazards, but be massive enough to produce near-existential harms? As a conventional aggressor, Iran could reasonably calculate that Jerusalem would make good on some identifiable portion of its nuclear threats. Here, however, Israel’s nuclear deterrent threat credibility would be dependent on variously antecedent or coinciding shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (the so-called “bomb in the basement”) to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Additional nuances will require correlative Israeli decisions. As a direct consequence of diminished nuclear ambiguity, Jerusalem should signal its Iranian adversary that Israel would wittingly cross the nuclear retaliatory threshold to prevent any acts of existential or near-existential aggression. Using more expressly military parlance, Israel’s immediate shift to apt forms of selective nuclear disclosure should seek to ensure the Jewish State’s success in expected struggles for “escalation dominance.” In part, the nuclear deterrence advantages for Israel of moving from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would lie in the signal it could “telegraph” to a still non-nuclear Iran. Such a signal would warn this adversary that Jerusalem was not limited to launching retaliations that employ massive and/or disproportionate levels of nuclear force. A still-timely Israeli move from nuclear ambiguity to nuclear disclosure could improve Israel’s prospects for deterring large-scale conventional attacks with “tailored” nuclear threats. After Syria’s collapse, a not-yet-nuclear Iran might more reasonably fear certain new Israel-Sunni Arab alignments. Israeli nuclear deterrence benefits against non-nuclear threats could extend to threats of nuclear counter-retaliation. If, for example, Israel initiates the next and more protracted cycle of war with Iran – a survival-based initiative that could represent “anticipatory self-defense” under Westphalian international law – the likelihood of suffering any massive Iranian conventional retaliation might be diminished. In essence, by moving immediately from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure, Jerusalem could upgrade its overall deterrence posture vis-à-vis Iran. In protecting itself from deliberate nuclear attack, Israeli strategists should accept certain core assumptions of Iranian enemy rationality. But even if these assumptions were well-founded, there would remain variously attendant dangers of unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war. These potentially existential dangers could be produced by enemy hacking operations, computer malfunction (an accidental nuclear war) or decision-making miscalculation (whether by Iran, by Israel, or by both/all parties.) In the portentous third scenario, damaging synergies could arise that would prove extremely difficult or even impossible to halt. To an unforeseeable extent, the geo-strategic search for “escalation dominance” by all sides to a potentially nuclear conflict would enlarge the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. These risks would include prospects of a nuclear war by accident and/or decisional miscalculation. The “solution” here could not be to simply wish-away the common search for “escalation dominance” (any such wish would be contrary to the “logic” of balance-of-power world politics), but to manage all prospectively nuclear crises at their lowest possible levels of destructiveness. Wherever feasible, it would be best to avoid such crises altogether, and to maintain in place reliable “circuit breakers” against strategic hacking or technical malfunction. In the expanding cauldron of Middle Eastern chaos, Israel will need to assess and re-assess its ties to certain Sunni Arab states. Among other things, Israeli nuclear strategists should competently re-assess the Trump-era “Abraham Accords:” Have these agreements given Israel any greater cause for security confidence, or do they enhance “peace” only where there have never been actual adversaries? And have the Abraham Accords hardened the Middle East Sunni-Shia dualism, thereby rendering Iran and its terror-surrogates an even greater threat to Israel? Though Israel has no regional nuclear adversaries at present, the steady approach of a nuclear Iran could encourage rapid nuclearization among such Sunni Arab states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt or United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following the turnover of Afghanistan to Taliban and other Islamist forces, the strengthening of al-Qaeda and ISIS offshoots in post-Assad Syria and the Pakistan cultivation of improved relations with Iran, non-Arab Pakistan could more likely become a direct adversary of Israel. Pakistan is an already nuclear Islamic state with substantial ties to China and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan, like Israel, is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. During any war with Iran, Jerusalem would need to “keep an eye” on Islamabad. “Everything is very simple in war,” says Carl von Clausewitz in “but the simplest thing is very difficult.” Longer term, salient issues of Israeli nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear threats could be impacted by Palestinian statehood To wit, while rarely mentioned in the same breath as nuclear war, the creation of Palestine could meaningfully affect Israel’s war preparations against a still non-nuclear Iran. , if Israel’s war against Iran were fought or continued after that enemy state became nuclear, the presence of a Palestinian state could negatively affect the correlation of military forces in the region. For the moment, a Palestinian state is generally “off the radar.” Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that once Palestine came into formal or existence as a sovereign state, any prior shift in Israel’s nuclear strategy from to would reduce Israel’s Jerusalem’s incentive to war against Iran. This expectation could make strategic sense only if Israel were first willing to believe that its nuclear deterrent threat, as a determinable consequence of this shift, was being taken with greater seriousness by Iran. Several corollary problems will soon need to be considered. First, how would Israel’s leadership actually that taking its bomb out of the “basement” had improved its nuclear deterrence posture regarding Iran? To an unpredictable extent, the credibility of Jerusalem’s nuclear threats would be contingent upon the variable severity of different provocations. It might prove believable if Israel were to threaten nuclear reprisals for provocations that endanger the physical survival of the state, but it would almost certainly be unbelievable to threaten such reprisals for relatively minor territorial infringements or almost any level of terrorist attack. Whatever analysts might conclude on such questions, because there exists no discoverable frequency of pertinent past events, judgments of probability Israel’s planners could represent only what Oswald Spengler famously called “glorified belief” in . There are other problems. To function successfully, Israel’s nuclear deterrent, even after conspicuous removal from the “basement,” would have to appear secure from Iranian preemptive strikes. Accordingly, Israel would need to be especially wary of “decapitation,” of losing the “head” of its military command and control system as a result of Iranian strikes. If Iran should remain unpersuaded by Jerusalem’s sudden shift away from deliberate nuclear ambiguity, it could initiate non-nuclear strikes that weaken or eviscerate Israel’s These strikes could include use of radiation dispersal weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP). Also to be taken seriously by Jerusalem would be an Iranian and/or surrogate conventional missile attack on Israel’s nuclear reactor at In weighing different arguments concerning the effect of Palestine upon Israeli nuclear deterrence, specific attention should be directed toward (1) Israel’s presumptions about the imminence and longevity of unconventional war; and (2) Israel’s long-term expectations regarding Iranian strategic vulnerability. Should Israel’s leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make an imminent unconventional war more destructive and that Iranian vulnerability to Israeli strikes would diminish, Jerusalem’s inclination to strike massively against Iran could be increased. To a still-indecipherable extent, Israel’s tactical/operational judgments on striking first would be affected by antecedent decisions on nuclear strategy. these critical decisions would concern “counter value” vs. “counterforce” targeting issues. If Israel should opt for nuclear deterrence based on an “assured destruction” (“counter value”) strategy, Jerusalem would likely choose a relatively small number of weapons that might be relatively inaccurate. A “counterforce” strategy, on the other hand, would require a larger number of more accurate weapons, ordnance that could destroy even the most hardened enemy targets. To an extent, “going for counterforce” could render Israeli nuclear threats more credible. This conclusion would be based largely on the assumption that because the effects of war-fighting nuclear weapons would be more precise and controlled, they would also be more amenable to actual use. Already, this precise calculation animates Pakistan’s strategy vis-à-vis India. Other things being equal, openly war-fighting postures of Israeli nuclear deterrence would more likely encourage Israeli defensive strikes. If counterforce targeted nuclear weapons were ever fired, especially in a proliferated regional setting, the resultant escalation could produce extensive counter value nuclear exchanges. Even if such escalations were averted, the “collateral” effects of counterforce detonations could prove devastating. In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a paradox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to Israeli security and survival in a world made more dangerous by the creation of Palestine, would require “usable” nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons were patently inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter. At the same time, the more usable such nuclear weapons become in order to enhance nuclear deterrence, the more likely it is, at one time or another, they will actually be fired. While this paradox would seem to suggest the rationality of Israel deploying only the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the fact that there could be no reliably coordinated agreements with Iran on deployable nuclear weapons points to a markedly different conclusion. Unless Israel were to calculate that more harmful weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for target populations, there would exist no tactical benefit to opting for the least injurious nuclear weapons. For the moment, at least, it appears that Israel has rejected any nuclear warfighting strategies of deterrence in favor of a still-implicit counter-value engagement posture. But this could change in response to the pace and direction of any ongoing Israel-Iran war and of Iranian nuclearization. In view of what is now generally recognized, there is every good reason to assume that Israel’s nuclear arsenal does exist and that Israel’s assorted enemies share this critical assumption. The most critical question about Israel’s nuclear deterrent, however, is not about , but . How likely is it that Israel, after launching non-nuclear strikes against Iranian hard targets would respond to enemy reprisals with a nuclear counter-retaliation? To answer this core question, Israel’s decision-makers will first have to put themselves into the shoes of pertinent Iranian leaders. Will these leaders calculate that they can afford to retaliate massively against Israel, i.e., that such retaliation would not produce a nuclear counter-retaliation? In asking this question, they will assume, of course, a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. Depending upon the way in which the enemy decision-makers interpret Israel’s authoritative perceptions, they will accept or reject the cost-effectiveness of a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. This means that it is likely in Israel’s best interests to communicate the following strategic assumption to all its existential enemies: . The plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced if enemy reprisals were to involve chemical, biological or EMP weapons. All such “glorified belief” calculations assume enemy rationality. In the absence of calculations that compare the costs and benefits of all strategic alternatives, what will happen in the imminent Israel-Iran must remain a matter of conjecture. The prospect of non-rational judgments in such a conflict is always plausible, especially as the influence of Islamist/ ideology could remain determinative among Iranian decisional elites. Still, various dangers of a nuclear war will obtain even among fully rational adversaries. This includes both deliberate nuclear war and inadvertent unclear war. Israel’s nuclear deterrent should always remain oriented toward dominating escalation at multiple and intersecting levels of conventional and unconventional enemy threats. For this to work, Israeli strategic planners should continuously bear in mind that intra-war operational success will depend on prior formulations of suitable national doctrine or strategic theory. In the end, the truest forms of Israeli power will have to reflect “a triumph of mind over mind,” not just of “mind over matter.” The most persuasive forms of military power on planet earth are not guns, battleships or missiles. Rather, they are believable promises of “life everlasting” or personal immortality When one finally uncovers what is most utterly important to the vast majority of human beings, this factor is a presumptive Lamentably, individuals all over the world too often regard the corrosive dynamics of belligerent nationalism as a preferred path to personal immortality. Why else, in essentially all global conflict ( national and -national) would each side seek so desperately align with God? Always, the loudest nationalistic claim is manipulatively reassuring: “Fear not,” the citizens and subjects are counseled, “God is on our side.” In our present analytic context, what promise could possibly prove more heartening to Israel’s enemies and more fearsome to Israel? Ultimately, Israel’s most compelling forms of strategic influence will derive not from high technology weaponry, but from the evident advantages of intellectual power. These always-overriding advantages must be explored and compared according to two very specific but overlapping criteria of assessment: law and strategy. In certain circumstances, these complex expectations might not be congruent or “in synch” with each other, but contradictory. Here, the underlying “mind over mind” challenges to Israel would become excruciatingly difficult; nonetheless, successful decision-making outcomes could still be kept in plain sight and remain sufficiently credible. What will be required will be a suitably theoretical appreciation of decisional complexity and a corresponding willingness to approach all relevant issues from convergent standpoints of science, intellect and dialectical analysis. In principle, at least, cumulative policy failures could produce broadly existential outcomes. Acknowledging this, Israel’s policy planners and decision–makers should strive to ensure that the beleaguered country’s nuclear deterrent could protect against large-scale non-nuclear attacks. A first step in reaching this assurance should be the systematic application of formal decision-theory to the “Iran problem,” a deductive task that would (1) not depend on historical precedent or data; and (2) give informed support to Israeli leadership decisions on nuclear deterrence and “escalation dominance.” For Israel, the primary battlefield with Iran should always be viewed as an intellectual rather than territorial arena. Despite recurrent threats of annihilation, Israel has never issued any expressly nuclear threats to Iran or its proxies. But present times are more strategically uncertain than ever before, and Israel’s optimal path to managing a catastrophic war with Iran should be to keep that threat non-nuclear. It follows that Jerusalem should prepare to use graduated nuclear threats against Iran . Among other things, this raises the prospect of a “limited nuclear war.” Immediately, to best ensure that Israeli paths to escalation dominance remain “navigable,” Jerusalem will need to implement far-reaching shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” For the moment, there would appear to be no more promising way to protect the Jewish State from an unconventional and eventually nuclear war with Iran. Such implementation could also serve Israel’s security needs vis-à-vis a nuclear North Korea functioning as Iranian military proxy, and prospectively-nuclear Sunni Arab states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Though the rationale for Sunni state nuclearization would be national self-defense from a nearly-nuclear Shiite state adversary in Tehran, this does not mean that these Arab states would become “friends of Israel.” Instead, it could signal the beginnings of a worst-case scenario in which the still-beleaguered Jewish State would face similarly recalcitrant nuclear foes. Summing up all pertinent arguments, there is nothing about the recent collapse of Syria’s al-Assad regime that should diminish Israel’s protection efforts against a still-nuclearizing Iran. Quite the contrary. The author’s first comprehensive examination of this issue was: Louis René Beres, (1986). But see also more recent: Louis René Beres, (2016; 2 ed., 2018). Expressions of enemy irrationality could take different or overlapping forms. These include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker). See authoritative at BESA (Israel). Says Carl on Clausewitz: “Defensive warfare does not consist of waiting idly for things to happen. We must wait only if it brings us visible and decisive advantages. That calm before the storm, when the aggressor is gathering new forces for a great blow, is most dangerous for the defender.” (See 1812). A similarly timeless argument was made much earlier by ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu in “Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain completer victory.” See also an by this writer, Louis René Beres, at Harvard Law School, . Such calculations would essentially be dialectical. The term “dialectical” originates from Greek expression for the art of conversation. A common contemporary meaning is method of seeking truth by correct reasoning. From the standpoint of shaping Israel’s intra-war deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Iran, the following operations should be regarded as essential but nonexclusive components: (1) a method of refutation conducted by examining logical consequences; (2) a method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species; (3) logical reasoning using premises that are probable or generally accepted; (4) formal logic; and (5) the logical development of thought through thesis and antithesis to fruitful synthesis of these opposites. In world politics and law, a state or insurgent-group is determinedly rational to the extent that its leadership always values collective survival more highly than any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. An insurgent/terrorist force will not always display such a clarifying or “helpful” preference ordering. Pertinent “post-Syria” examples regarding Israel are assorted Sunni jihadists spawned or strengthened by al-Assad’s overthrow. In essence, these coalescing terror groups represent new variants of al-Qaeda and ISIS. See: Anatol Rapoport, (1964). Says Rapoport, in an early observation that now applies usefully to Israel, Iran and nuclear war avoidance: “Formal decision-theory does not depend on data.... The task of theory is confined to the construction of a deductive apparatus, to be used in deriving logically necessary conclusions from given assumptions.” See, for example, by this author: Louis René Beres, “Martyrdom and International Law,” , September 10, 2018; and Louis René Beres, “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption and Irrationality,” Vol. 39, No.3., 2007-2008, pp. 709-730. See by this author, Louis René Beres, at INSS (Tel Aviv). Embedded in attempts to achieve this success would be variously credible threats of “assured destruction.” This term references ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” after absorbing an attacker’s first strike. In the traditional nuclear lexicon, (MAD) would describe a stand-off condition in which an assured destruction capacity is possessed by both (or all) opposing sides. would be those which target only an adversary’s strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructure. Such strategies could be dangerous not only because of the “collateral damage” they might produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood of first-strike attacks. would refer to harms done to human and non-human resources as a consequence of strategic strikes directed at enemy forces or military facilities. Even such “unintended” damage could quickly involve large numbers of casualties/fatalities. In effect, Israel’s posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity was already breached by two of the country’s prime ministers, first, by Shimon Peres, on December 22, 1995, and second, by Ehud Olmert, on December 11, 2006. Peres, speaking to a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, then stated publicly: “...give me peace, and we’ll give up the atom. That’s the whole story.” When, later, Olmert offered similarly general but also revelatory remarks, they were described widely (and benignly) as “slips of the tongue.” It’s now a very delicate regional balance of power for Israel to negotiate. For years, a Salafi/Deobandi (Sunni) Crescent has emerged to challenge the Shiite axis. With the fall of al-Assad in Syria, this axis has been weakened, most obviously Iran. At the same time, Iran will still find support in parts of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, while Israel will now have to deal with the potentially more problematic Sunni terrorists actively institutionalizing operations in Damascus. This lawful option can be found in customary international law. The most precise origins of in such authoritative law lie in the a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, 2 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, , 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) concluded the Thirty Years War and created the still-existing state system. See: , Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and , Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119. Together, these two treaties comprise the “Peace of Westphalia.” Incontestably, since this Peace put an end to the last of the major religious wars sparked by the Reformation, the “state system” has been ridden with evident strife and recurrent calamity. As a global “state of nature” characterized by interminable “war of all against all” (a the conspicuous legacy of Westphalia has proven disappointing. . The idea of a – an idea of which the nuclear-age is merely a modern variant – has never been more than facile metaphor. Oddly, it has never had anything to do with ascertaining equilibrium. As such, balance is always more-or-less a matter of individual subjective perception. Adversarial states can never be sufficiently confident that identifiable strategic circumstances are actually “balanced” in their favor. In consequence, each side must perpetually fear that it will be left behind, a fear creating ever-wider patterns of world system insecurity and disequilibrium. See the Declaration; Also to be considered as complementary in this connection is the (October 23, 2020) and (December 10, 2020). See David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “ ,” Institute for Science and International Security (December 10, 2024). In essence, this technical report “sounds an alarm” that there is taking place “a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant.” In principle, the existential dangers posed by Iran could be more-or-less effectively balanced by a new Sunni Arab nuclear capability in Riyadh, Cairo or Abu Dhabi. In that ironic circumstance, Jerusalem might conclude that certain expressions of selective Arab nuclearization would represent a helpful or even benign development. In the longer term view, however, Jerusalem would be forced to decide which particular adversary or pair of adversaries was potentially more intolerable, and whether or not some form of preemption might sometime be required. Seventeenth-century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, instructs that although international relations (the state of nations) is in the state of nature, it is nonetheless more tolerable than the condition of individual men in nature. This is because, with individual human beings, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.” Now, with the advent of nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe that the state of nations remains more tolerable. Rather, nuclear weapons are bringing the state of nations closer to the true Hobbesian state of nature. See, also, David P. Gauthier, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207. As with Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that the state of nations is not quite as intolerable as the state of nature between individuals. The state of nations, reasons Pufendorf, “lacks those inconveniences which are attendant upon a pure state of nature....” And similarly, Spinoza suggests “that a commonwealth can guard itself against being subjugated by another, as a man in the state of nature cannot do.” See, A.G. Wernham, ed., , iii, II (Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 295. See For much earlier original writings by this author on the prospective impact of a Palestinian state on Israeli nuclear deterrence, see: Louis René Beres, “Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel’s Strategic, Tactical and Legal Options,” Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel), ACPR Policy Paper No. 102, April 2000, 110 pp; Louis René Beres, “After the `Peace Process:’ Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 15, No. 2., Winter 1997, pp. 301-335; Louis René Beres, “Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope,” ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 23., No. 4., Summer 1997, pp. 539-568; Louis René Beres, “Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 10., No. 1., Spring 1997, pp. 75-90; Louis René Beres, “On Living in a Bad Neighborhood: The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons,” POLITICAL CROSSROADS, Vol. 5., Nos. 1/2, 1997, pp. 143-157; Louis René Beres, “Facing the Apocalypse: Israel and the `Peace Process,’” BTZEDEK: THE JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE JEWISH COMMENTARY (Israel), Vol. 1., No. 3., Fall/Winter 1997, pp. 32-35; Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why Golan Demilitarization Would Not Work,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XXIV, No. 1., Winter 1996, pp. 75-76; Louis René Beres, “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 17., No. 2., 1999, pp. 229-286; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” CROSSROADS: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL JOURNAL, No. 31, 1991, pp. 97-104; Louis René Beres, “The Question of Palestine and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 62, No. 4., October-December 1991, pp. 451-460; Louis René Beres, “Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol. 22., No. 2., June 1991, pp. 227-234; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel’s Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE (Israel), Vol. 4., Bulletin No, 3., October 1991, pp. 3-10; Louis René Beres, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1/1990, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 40 pp; and Louis René Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 4., Fall 1991, pp. 48-55. Contending Palestinian authorities still remain unable to meet variously codified expectations of statehood identified at the 1934 . This “Montevideo Convention” is the treaty governing statehood in all applicable international law. Jurisprudentially, Palestine still remains a “Non-Member Observer State.” The argument that a Palestinian state would be more benign because it could be “demilitarized” is unsupportable in strategic, political or jurisprudential terms. See, by this writer, Louis René Beres, “Why the Allen Plan and Palestinian Demilitarization Could Never Protect Israel,” 16 July, 2017. Earlier law journal articles on this limitation, co-authored with former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval, include: Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” , Vol. 28, No.5., 1995m pp. 959-972. The modern philosophic origins of “will” are discoverable in the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, especially (1818). For his own inspiration, Schopenhauer drew upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Friedrich Nietzsche drew just as importantly upon Arthur Schopenhauer. Goethe was also a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’Gasset, author of the singularly prophetic twentieth-century work, ( ;1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for of Berlin on the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968). “I believe,” says Oswald Spengler in his magisterial (1918), “is the one great word against metaphysical fear.” “Military doctrine” is not the same as “military strategy.” Doctrine “sets the stage” for strategy. It identifies various central beliefs that must subsequently animate any actual “order of battle.” Among other things, describes underlying general principles on how a particular war ought to be waged. The reciprocal task for is to adapt as required in order to best support previously-fashioned military doctrine. In world politics, says philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, any deeply-felt promise of immortality must be of “transcendent importance.” See his 1927. In the nineteenth century, in his posthumously published lecture on Politics (1896), German historian Heinrich von Treitschke observed: “Individual man sees in his own country the realization of his earthly immortality.” Earlier, German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel opined, in his (1820), that the state represents “the march of God in the world.” The “deification” of a transformation from mere principle of action to a sacred end in itself, drew its originating strength from the doctrine of sovereignty advanced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Initially conceived as a principle of internal order, this doctrine underwent a specific metamorphosis, whence it became the formal or justifying rationale for international anarchy – that is, for the global “state of nature.” First established by Jean Bodin as a juristic concept in (1576), sovereignty came to be regarded as a power absolute and above the law. Understood in terms of modern international relations, this doctrine encouraged the notion that states lie above and beyond any form of legal regulation in their interactions with each other. At the same time, strategists cannot be allowed to forget, that theoretical fruitfulness must be achieved at some more-or-less tangible costs of “dehumanization.” Accordingly, Goethe reminds in , the original fragment: “All theory, dear friend, is grey, And the golden tree of life is green.” Translated by Professor Beres from the German: In the words of Jose Ortega y’Gasset: “Science, by which I mean the entire body of knowledge about things, whether corporeal or spiritual, is as much a work of imagination as it is of observation.... The latter is not possible without the former.” ( 1958). This does not mean trying to account for absolutely every pertinent explanatory variable. Clarifications can be found at “Occam’s Razor” or the “principle of parsimony.” This stipulates preference for the simplest explanation still consistent with scientific method. Regarding current concerns for Israel’s nuclear strategy, it suggests, , that the country’s military planners not seek to identify and examine every seemingly important variable, but rather to “say the most, with the least.” This presents an important and often neglected cautionary, because all too often, policy-makers and planners mistakenly attempt to be too inclusive. This attempt unwittingly distracts them from forging more efficient and “parsimonious” strategic theories. See: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043 See by this author at BESA (Israel), Louis René Beres. For a coherent and comprehensive summation, see recent by Yaakov Lapin. World court established at The Hague On December 13, 1920, the League of Nations Assembly, sitting in Geneva, approved the statute setting up the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.Learn more about the . Visit the website of the Permanent Court's successor body, the . President Wilson arrives in France to negotiate WWI treaty On December 13, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson arrived in France to negotiate a treaty to conclude World War I. Wilson was the first US President to visit Europe while in office. His meeting with the other Allied leaders would result in the , which created the League of Nations and redrew borders across Europe. The treaty, however, was rejected by the US Senate, thus preventing the U.S. from joining the League with the other major powers.

Mexico's president discussed migration and drug trafficking with US President-elect Donald Trump on Wednesday -- two issues he had raised as justification for raising import tariffs on America's southern neighbor. Claudia Sheinbaum said she had had "an excellent conversation" with Trump, just hours after her economy minister warned that the cost to US companies of Trump's tariffs would be "huge." "We discussed Mexico's strategy regarding the phenomenon of migration," Sheinbaum said on X, adding she had told Trump that caravans of migrants "are not arriving at the northern border because they are being attended to in Mexico." They also discussed "strengthening collaboration on security issues" as well as "the campaign we are conducting in the country to prevent the consumption of fentanyl," the president said. Trump on Monday said he would impose tariffs of 25 percent on Mexican and Canadian imports and 10 percent on goods from China. "This Tariff will remain in effect until such time as Drugs, in particular Fentanyl, and all Illegal Aliens stop this Invasion of our Country!" Trump wrote on his Truth Social page. The Republican, who won an election in which illegal migration was a top issue, has vowed to declare a national emergency on border security and use the US military to carry out a mass deportation of undocumented migrants. Mexican Economy Minister Marcelo Ebrard said Wednesday some "400,000 jobs will be lost" in the United States if Trump followed through on his threat. He cited a study based on figures from US carmakers that manufacture in Mexico. - 'A shot in the foot' - Ebrard said the tariffs would also hit US consumers hard, citing the US market for pickup trucks -- most of which are manufactured in Mexico. The tariffs, the minister said, would add $3,000 to the cost of a new vehicle. "The impact of this measure will chiefly be felt by consumers in the United States... That is why we say that it would be a shot in the foot," Ebrard told reporters, speaking alongside Sheinbaum at her regular morning conference. Mexico and China have been particularly vociferous in their opposition to Trump's threats of a trade war from day one of his second presidential term, which begins on January 20. Sheinbaum has declared the threats "unacceptable" and pointed out that Mexico's drug cartels exist mainly to serve drug use in the United States. China has warned that "no one will win a trade war." During his first term as president, Trump launched full-blown trade hostilities with Beijing, imposing significant tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods. China responded with retaliatory tariffs on American products, particularly affecting US farmers. The United States, Mexico and Canada are tied to a three-decade-old largely duty-free trade agreement, called the USMCA, that was renegotiated under Trump after he complained that US businesses, especially automakers, were losing out. jla/cb/mlr/bjt

CHATHAM, N.J. (AP) — That buzzing coming out of New Jersey? It’s unclear if it’s drones or something else, but for sure the nighttime sightings are producing tons of talk, a raft of conspiracy theories and craned necks looking skyward. Cropping up on local news and social media sites around Thanksgiving, reported over New Jersey has reached incredible heights. This week seems to have begun a new, higher-profile chapter: (but so far not getting) explanations from federal and state authorities about what’s behind them. Gov. Phil Murphy asking for answers. New Jersey’s new senator, Andy Kim, spent Thursday night on a drone hunt in rural northern New Jersey, and posted about it on X. But perhaps the most fantastic development is the dizzying proliferation of conspiracies — none of which has been confirmed or suggested by federal and state officials who say they’re looking into what’s happening. It has become shorthand to refer to the flying machines as drones, but there are questions about whether what people are seeing are unmanned aircraft or something else. Some theorize the drones came from an Iranian mothership. Others think they are the Secret Service making sure President-elect Donald Trump’s Bedminster property is secure. Others worry about China. The deep state. And on. In the face of uncertainty, people have done what they do in 2024: Create a social media group. The Facebook page, , has nearly 44,000 members, up from 39,000 late Thursday. People are posting their photo and video sightings, and the online commenters take it from there. One video shows a whitish light flying in a darkened sky, and one commenter concludes it’s otherworldly. “Straight up orbs,” the person says. Others weigh in to say it’s a plane or maybe a satellite. Another group called for hunting the drones literally, shooting them down like turkeys. (Do not shoot at anything in the sky, experts warn.) Trisha Bushey, 48, of Lebanon Township, New Jersey, lives near Round Valley Reservoir where there have been numerous sightings. She said she first posted photos online last month wondering what the objects were and became convinced they were drones when she saw how they moved and when her son showed her on a flight tracking site that no planes were around. Now she’s glued to the Mystery Drones page, she said. “I find myself — instead of Christmas shopping or cleaning my house — checking it,” she said. She doesn’t buy what the governor said, that Murphy told Biden on Friday that residents need answers. The federal Homeland Security Department and FBI also said in a joint statement they have no evidence that the sightings pose “a national security or public safety threat or have a foreign nexus.” “How can you say it’s not posing a threat if you don’t know what it is?” she said. “I think that’s why so many people are uneasy.” Then there’s the notion that people could misunderstand what they’re seeing. William Austin is the president of Warren County Community College, which has a drone technology degree program, and is coincidentally located in one of the sighting hotspots. Austin says he has looked at videos of purported drones and that airplanes are being misidentified as drones. He cited an optical effect called parallax, which is the apparent shift of an object when viewed from different perspectives. Austin encouraged people to download flight and drone tracker apps so they can better understand what they’re looking at. Nonetheless, people continue to come up with their own theories. “It represents the United States of America in 2024,” Austin said. “We’ve lost trust in our institutions, and we need it.” Federal officials echo Austin’s view that many of the sightings are piloted aircraft such as planes and helicopters being mistaken for drones, according to lawmakers and Murphy. That’s not really convincing for many, though, who are homing in on the sightings beyond just New Jersey and the East Coast, where others have reported seeing the objects. For Seph Divine, 34, another member of the drone hunting group who lives in Eugene, Oregon, it feels as if it’s up to citizen sleuths to solve the mystery. He said he tries to be a voice of reason, encouraging people to fact check their information, while also asking probing questions. “My main goal is I don’t want people to be caught up in the hysteria and I also want people to not just ignore it at the same time,” he said. “Whether or not it’s foreign military or some secret access program or something otherworldly, whatever it is, all I’m saying is it’s alarming that this is happening so suddenly and so consistently for hours at a time,” he added. ___ Associated Press reporter Hallie Golden in Seattle contributed to this report. Mike Catalini, The Associated Press

Vanderbilt aims to conclude its nonconference schedule with a sixth straight win when it hosts New Orleans on Monday in Nashville, Tenn. Since losing to Drake 81-70 in the Charleston Classic title game on Nov. 24, the Commodores (11-1) have jumped to 37th in the NCAA Evaluation Tool (NET) ranking. They have won their last five games by a combined 138 points, with 52 of those in a 105-53 rout of The Citadel on Dec. 18. New Orleans (2-10) has a NET ranking of 334 and enters on a six-game skid, two of those coming losses to Southeastern Conference members Texas (98-62) and LSU (86-70). First-year coach Stacy Hollowell's squad fell 86-61 on Saturday at McNeese State, which dropped the Privateers to 0-2 in the Southland Conference. Vanderbilt coach Mark Byington, who is also in his first season, has done an impressive job in overhauling a roster within a program that went 9-23 last year. Byington hit the transfer portal hard and found both star power in Jason Edwards, scoring balance in Devin McGlockton, AJ Hoggard and Tyler Nickel and additional depth via nine newcomers who average at least 15 minutes. Edwards is the SEC's third-leading scorer at 18.9 points per game, while McGlockton (11.8 ppg) Hoggard (10.3) and Nickel (10.0) round out the Commodores' double-digit scorers. Vanderbilt is shooting just 32.7 percent this season from 3-point range but has canned 20 of 41 attempts (48.8 percent) over its last two games. "After practice, a lot of guys continue to get 50 makes in or more after practice, so the reps are just going to show we can all shoot the ball pretty good," guard MJ Collins said. New Orleans has a star of its own in guard James White, who leads the Southland in scoring (19.2) and rebounding (7.9). The Privateers' upset hopes ride on him and freshman MJ Thomas (8.3 ppg, 7.0 rpg), who has averaged 11.4 points in the last five games. White has totaled 12 minutes over two appearances against Vanderbilt in 2022 and 2023 while at Ole Miss. "(White is) a rangy, athletic player with all-conference potential," Hollowell told Blue Ribbon College Basketball Yearbook this summer. This will be New Orleans's ninth straight road game. The Privateers have played just once at home (a Nov. 9 loss to Troy), but will host their next three games after Monday. --Field Level MediaUnwrap the latest AI features with Amazon Fire TabletsNEW YORK -- In a string of visits, dinners, calls, monetary pledges and social media overtures, big tech chiefs — including Apple's Tim Cook , OpenAI’s Sam Altman , Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg , SoftBank's Masayoshi Son and Amazon’s Jeff Bezos — have joined a parade of business and world leaders in trying to improve their standing with President-elect Donald Trump before he takes office in January. “The first term, everybody was fighting me,” Trump said in remarks at Mar-a-Lago . “In this term, everybody wants to be my friend.” Tech companies and leaders have now poured millions into his inauguration fund, a sharp increase — in most cases — from past pledges to incoming presidents. But what does the tech industry expect to gain out of their renewed relationships with Trump? A clue to what the industry is looking for came just days before the election when Microsoft executives — who’ve largely tried to show a neutral or bipartisan stance — joined with a close Trump ally, venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, to publish a blog post outlining their approach to artificial intelligence policy. “Regulation should be implemented only if its benefits outweigh its costs,” said the document signed by Andreessen, his business partner Ben Horowitz, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and the company's president, Brad Smith. They also urged the government to back off on any attempt to strengthen copyright laws that would make it harder for companies to use publicly available data to train their AI systems. And they said, “the government should examine its procurement practices to enable more startups to sell technology to the government.” Trump has pledged to rescind President Joe Biden’s sweeping AI executive order, which sought to protect people’s rights and safety without stifling innovation. He hasn’t specified what he would do in its place, but his campaign said AI development should be “rooted in Free Speech and Human Flourishing.” Trump's choice to head the Interior Department, North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum, has spoken openly about the need to boost electricity production to meet increased demand from data centers and artificial intelligence. “The AI battle affects everything from defense to healthcare to education to productivity as a country,′′ Burgum said on Nov. 15, referring to artificial intelligence. “And the AI that’s coming in the next 18 months is going to be revolutionary. So there’s just a sense of urgency and a sense of understanding in the Trump administration′′ to address it. Demand for data centers ballooned in recent years due to the rapid growth of cloud computing and AI, and local governments are competing for lucrative deals with big tech companies. But as data centers begin to consume more resources, some residents are pushing back against the world’s most powerful corporations over concerns about the economic, social and environmental health of their communities. “Maybe Big Tech should buy a copy of ‘The Art of The Deal’ to figure out how to best negotiate with this administration,” suggested Paul Swanson, an antitrust attorney for the law firm Holland & Hart. “I won’t be surprised if they find ways to reach some accommodations and we end up seeing more negotiated resolutions and consent decrees.” Although federal regulators began cracking down on Google and Facebook during Trump’s first term as president — and flourished under Biden — most experts expect his second administration to ease up on antitrust enforcement and be more receptive to business mergers. Google may benefit from Trump’s return after he made comments on the campaign trail suggesting a breakup of the company isn’t in the U.S. national interest, after a judge declared its search engine an illegal monopoly . But recent nominations put forward by his transition team have favored those who have been critical of Big Tech companies, suggesting Google won’t be entirely off the hook. Cook’s notoriously rocky relationship with the EU can be traced back to a 2016 ruling from Brussels in a tax case targeting Apple. Cook slammed the bloc’s order for Apple to pay back up to 13 billion euros ($13.7 billion) in Irish back taxes as “total political crap.” Trump, then in his first term as president, piled on, referring to the European Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was spearheading a campaign on special tax deals and a crackdown on Big Tech companies, as someone who “really hates the U.S.” Brussels was eventually vindicated after the bloc’s top court rejected Apple’s appeal this year, though it didn’t stop Cook from calling Trump to complain, Trump recounted in a podcast in October. Altman , Amazon and Meta all pledged to donate $1 million each to Trump’s inaugural fund. During his first term, Trump criticized Amazon and railed against the political coverage at The Washington Post, which billionaire Bezos owns. Meanwhile, Bezos had criticized some of Trump’s past rhetoric. In 2019, Amazon also argued in a court case that Trump’s bias against the company harmed its chances of winning a $10 billion Pentagon contract. More recently, Bezos has struck a more conciliatory tone. He recently said at The New York Times’ DealBook Summit in New York that he was “optimistic” about Trump’s second term, while also endorsing president-elect’s plans to cut regulations. The donation from Meta came just weeks after Zuckerberg met with Trump privately at Mar-a-Lago. During the 2024 campaign, Zuckerberg did not endorse a candidate for president, but voiced a more positive stance toward Trump. Earlier this year, he praised Trump’s response to his first assassination attempt. Still, Trump in recent months had continued to attack Zuckerberg publicly. And Altman, who is in a legal dispute with AI rival Elon Musk, has said he is “not that worried” about the Tesla CEO’s influence in the incoming administration. Musk, an early OpenAI investor and board member, sued the company earlier this year alleging that the maker of ChatGPT betrayed its founding aims of benefiting the public good rather than pursuing profits. “We have two multi-billionaires, Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, who are tasked with cutting what they’re saying will be multiple trillions of dollars from the federal budget, reducing the civil service, the workforce,” said Rob Lalka, a business professor at Tulane University. Musk, he said, has a level of access to the White House that very few others have had -- access that allows him to potentially influence multiple policy areas, including foreign policy, automotive and energy policy through EVs, and tech policy on artificial intelligence. “Elon Musk walked into Twitter’s headquarters with a sink and then posted, ‘let that sink in,‘” he said. “Elon Musk then posted a status update on X, a picture of himself with a sink in the Oval Office and said, 'Let that sink in.′"TROY, Ala. (AP) — Amir "Primo" Spears led UTSA with 29 points, including a three-point play with 25.8 seconds left, as the Roadrunners knocked off Merrimack 76-74 on Wednesday. Spears added five rebounds for the Roadrunners (2-3). Jonnivius Smith scored 11 points while shooting 5 of 7 from the field and added 20 rebounds. Marcus Millender went 3 of 9 from the field (2 for 6 from 3-point range) to finish with 10 points. Adam Clark led the way for the Warriors (1-6) with 28 points, six rebounds and four steals. Devon Savage added 15 points for Merrimack. Bryan Etumnu finished with 12 points, 11 rebounds and four blocks. The loss was the Warriors' sixth in a row. Damari Monsanto put up eight points in the first half for UTSA, who led 37-36 at halftime. Spears scored a team-high 24 points for UTSA in the second half. The Associated Press created this story using technology provided by Data Skrive and data from Sportradar .